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- 1. Many extremists increasingly suspicious of De Gaulle's intentions in Algeria.
- Chief of Armed Forces General Ely has stated that he is very upset with junior officers mixing in politics.

- 3. Loyalty of De Gaulle's Delegate General Salan is still not clear. He is reported influenced by young colonels.
- 4. Organization which engineered 13 May coup reported intact and in state of readiness.
- C. De Gaulle taking steps to strengthen position.
 - Recent appointment of General indre Zeller in place of Lorillot as army chief of staff puts vigorous personality in place of man disliked by army because he accepted Ely's job under Pflimlin government.
 - Ely said General Pierre Garbay under consideration as commander of military operations Algeria as counterbalance to Salam.
 - 3. Soustelle expects cabinet appointment in charge Algeria.
 - (a) His views seem closer to De Gaulle's than extremists realize.
- III. Recent PLN messages indicate they will attempt widespread action in Algeria on night following De Gaulla's departure.
 - A. This action will tend to counteract effect of De Caulle's conciliatory gestures to Moslems.